Federal Procedure -- Transfer of Cases Between Law and Equity Sides of Court by Uzzell, T. A., Jr.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 9 | Number 1 Article 21
12-1-1930
Federal Procedure -- Transfer of Cases Between
Law and Equity Sides of Court
T. A. Uzzell Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law
Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
T. A. Uzzell Jr., Federal Procedure -- Transfer of Cases Between Law and Equity Sides of Court, 9 N.C. L. Rev. 82 (1930).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol9/iss1/21
82 THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
as it does have will appear in the witness' reputation for veracity or
his general reputation in the community-a familiar inquiry.
Conclusion
The witness box should not be made more forbidding to persons
of potential value as witnesses by the fear of a scrutiny of their per-
sonal thoughts. The 1931 Legislature should adopt the remedy ac-
cepted by the majority of American states by removing religious
belief as a test of competency and prohibiting evidence of it to im-
peach. The Pennsylvania statute is a desirable model: "No witness
shall be questioned in any judicial proceeding concerning his religious
belief; nor shall any evidence be heard upon the subject for the
purpose of affecting either his competency or credibility." 24
JAmES H. CHADBOURN.
Federal Procedure-Transfer of Cases Between Law
and Equity Sides of Court
The case of Clarksbury Trust Co. v. Conmwrcial Casualty Co.'
was an action at law in a Federal District Court for West Virginia to
recover on a bond issued -by the defendant to cover a deposit of the
plaintiff in a Pennsylvania bank. The deposit in question was upon
a time certificate and was the only one contemplated in the security
transaction; the bond, however, clearly applied only to deposits sub-
ject to check. The plaintiff's declaration alleged that this was due to
a mutual mistake of law as to the meaning of the coverage clause in
the bond. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant. Held,
on appeal, reversed and remanded with directions to transfer the case
to the equity side for reformation, with leave to amend the pleadings
and to introduce further evidence.
The questions of transfer between the law and equity sides of the
Federal Courts arise under the Judicial Code, section 274a,2 which
provides: "That in case any of said courts (courts of the United
States) shall find that a suit at law should have been brought in equity
or a suit in equity should have been brought at law, the court shall
order any amendments to the pleadings which may be necessary to
conform them to the proper practice. Any party to the suit shall have
the right, at any stage of the cause, to amend his pleadings so as to
PA. STAT. (West, 1920) §21834.140 F. (2d) 626 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
'38 STAT. 956 (1915), 28 U. S. C. A., §397 (1928).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
obviate the objection that his suit was not brought on the right side
of the court. The cause shall proceed and be determined upon such
amended pleadings. All testimony taken before such amendment, if
preserved, shall stand as testimony in the cause with like effect as if
the pleadings had been originally in the amended form." This pro-
vision, together with equity rules 22 and 23,3 and section 274b Judi-
cial Code4 which provides that equitable defenses may be interposed
in actions at law by answer, plea or replication, greatly facilitates the
fusion of law and equity in the Federal Courts. 5
The Court of Appeals of the Fourth Circuit has directly con-
sidered section 274a in eight cases. The court first construed the
statute in 1916 shortly after its passage.0 Judge Pritchard, though
not deciding the case solely upon these grounds stated that the statute
(section 274a) "relates only to the power of the court in a case where
a suit has been improperly brought either on the equity or law side,
and authorizes amendments to have the pleading conform to the
proper practice." Thus Judge Pritchard narrowly interpreted the
statute as applying to actions brought on the proper side of the court
but with the wrong type of pleadings. The next case in this circuit7
did not consider section 274a, but decided under equity rule 22 that
the case should not be transferred to law as a cause of action in equity
had been set out. Beginning with the case of Fidelity and Casualty
Co. v. Glenn8 the court indicates a more liberal attitude. In speaking
'Rule 22: "If at any time it appear that a suit commenced in equity should
have been brought as an action on the law side of the court, it shall be forth-
with transferred to the law side and be there proceeded with, with only such
alteration in the pleadings as shall be essential." Rule 23 provides: "If in a
suit in equity a matter ordinarily determinable at law arises, such matter shall
be determined in that suit according to the principles applicable, without send-
ing the case or question to the law side of the court." Rule 22 was promul-
gated to relieve the situation which §2 74a finally cured, and rule 23 was in-
tended to obviate the old practice of sending feigned issues to the law side
of the court for trial by jury. The latter does not restrict the operation of the
former.
'38 STAT. 956 (1915), 28 U. S. C. A., §397 (1928).
'McCormick, The Fusion of Law and Equity in United States Courts(1928) 6 N. C. L. Rav. 283; McBaine, Equitable Defenses to Actions at Law
in the Federal Courts (1929) 17 CALiF. L. REv. 591.
'Waldo v. Wilson, 231 Fed. 654 (C. C. A. 4th, 1916), reversed 221 Fed. 505,
and certiorari denied, 241 U. S. 673, 36 Sup. Ct. 724, 60 L. ed. 1231 (1916).
" Gatewood v. New River Consol. Coal & Coke Co., 239 Fed. 65 (C. C. A.
4th, 1916) (Plaintiff improperly sued in equity for breach of contract, but set
out that, as agent for defendant company, he was entitled to certain com-
missions for products sold. in his territory. He did not know the quantity
of the product sold nor its price. He prayed for a discovery of the facts and
for an accounting).
'3 F. (2d) 913 (C. C. A. 4th, 1925) (Action at law against surety on penal
bond securing performance of contract. Defendant interposed equitable de-
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of section 274b it says: "These statutes are remedial in character, and
should be liberally construed, to the end, if possible, of a single, direct,
and speedy trial and conclusion of the issues involved in the litiga-
tion." The instant case was the first to arise in the Fourth Circuit,
after the leading case of Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Bank0 where
Chief Justice Taft construed section 274b, and in a dictum pointed
the direction in which the construction of section 274a should go. In
the remaining five cases which have arisen in the Fourth Circuit, the
court has consistently followed this liberal and progressive tendency.
Singularly enough all of the cases have arisen on the law side of the
court and the Circuit Court of Appeals has either transferred them to
equity as in the principal case ;'0 treated the writ of error as an appeal
in equity;". affirmed judgment because it appeared that the result
reached in law was what should have been reached in equity,12 or
sustained the lower court -because the complaint stated no ground for
relief either at law or in equity.' 3
The usual way to take advantage of the statute is by motion,14
but motions to amend or to introduce new evidence tending to estab-
lish an equitable case have also been construed as within the intent of
the statute.15 Also, the trial judge may, of his own motion, transfer
fense of fraud. Trial court refused to transfer case under authority of §274 b.
C. C. A. refused new trial in equity because result would be same as that
reached at law).
'260 U. S. 235, 43 Sup. Ct. 118, 67 L. ed. 202 (1922) (The defendant, in an
action at law, for money had and received claimed to be merely a stake-holder
of the money in question and offered to pay it into court when the other claim-
ants were joined. On appeal the C. C. A. treated the case as an action at law.
Reversed by the Supreme Court and remanded to C. C. A. under authority of
§274b, for consideration and determination as an appeal in equity. Through-
out, the opinion expresses an attitude much more favorable to justice for the
litigant than adherent to strict rules of procedure) ; Twist v. Prairie Oil &
Gas Co., 274 U. S. 684, 47 Sup. Ct. 755, 71 L. ed. 1297 (1927).
"Hutchings v. Caledonian Ins. Co. of Scotland, 35 F. (2d) 309 (C. C. A.
4th, 1929).
" National Surety Co. v. County Board of Education, 15 F. (2d) 993 (C. C.
A. 4th, 1926) (Surety on a contractor's bond, after default, attempted to
establish at law an equitable lien arising under the contract of suretyship. The
pleadings being proper, the C. C. A. decided the case as in equity).
" Great American Ins. Co. v. Johnson, et al., 25 F. (2d) 847 (C. C. A. 4th,
1928) (Agent of insurance company erroneously made out policy in corporate
name, instead of name of the individual owning the property insured. Prop-
erty destroyed and individual sues at law and procures judgment. The result
was correct, the method wrong); Fidelity and Casualty Co. v. Glenn, Vupra
note 8.
"' Southern Surety Co. v. Plott, 28 F. (2d) 698, 701 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928).
"Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Bank, supra note 9; Fidelity and Casualty Co.
v. Glenn, supra note 8; National Surety Co. v. County Board of Education,
supra note 11.
'Hutchings v. Caledonian Ins. Co. of Scotland, supra note 10.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
the case.16 The circuit courts, however, have split on this question.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in the recent case of Amer-
ican Land Co. v. City of Keene,17 sustained the District Court's
refusal to transfer the case, "even if it were proper under section
274a," because plaintiff had made no such request to the trial court.
The court interpreted the litigant's failure to make a motion for trans-
fer as an election or waiver on his part. "This court will not compel
a litigant to transfer its action from equity to law or vice versa against
his will." Cases from the Second,' 8 Seventh,19 and Eighth20 Circuits
were relied upon. It would seem that the attitude of the Fourth Cir-
cuit is more reasonable. The court in the case of National Surety Co.
v. County Board of Education declared that on motion of parties, or
by the court ex mero mnotu a cause may be transferred from one side
of the Federal courts to the other,21 and in the principal case the
court remanded the cause for further proceedings in equity upon
argument of counsel that if a cause of action in law had not been
stated then one in equity had. The Fourth Circuit, alone, has seen fit
to resort in this connection to the act of February 26, 1919 (U. S. C.
A. section 391) which enables the circuit court to give complete
justice in the particular case by requiring, "that on the hearing of an
appeal, to give judgment after an examination of the entire record
before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or excep-
tions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." It is
submitted that such a construction is more in accord with the remark
of Chief Justice Taft: "To be sure, these sections do not create one
form of civil action as do the codes of procedure in the states, but
they manifest a purpose on the part of Congress to change from a
suit at law to one in equity and the reverse with as little delay and as
little insistence on form as possible, and are long steps toward code
practice." 2 2
T. A. UZZELL, JR.
" National Surety Co. v. County Board of Education, s'upra note 11; Great
American Ins. Co. v. Johnson et al., supra note 12.1741 F. (2d) 484 (C. C. A. 1st, 1930).
"Procter & Gamble Co. v. Powelson, 288 Fed. 299 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1923).
"Mobile Shipbuilding Co. v. Federal Bridge and Structural Co., 280 Fed.
292 (C. C. A. 7th, 1922).
" Fay v. Hill, 249 Fed. 415 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918).
2 15 F. (2d) 993 (C. C. A. 4th, 1926).
Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon Bank, supra note 9.
